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Buying the Way to a Better Gulf Fishery: Buybacks for Hurricane
Relief and Fisheries Rationalization in the Gulf of Mexico
by Mike Pappas
Editors’ Summary: Fishing stocks in the Gulf of Mexico have been dwindling
for years, and in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the fishing industry has found itself in even deeper waters. But while the two hurricanes
caused massive damage to fishing fleets and infrastructure, they may have also
created an opportunity for reform in the way Gulf fisheries are managed. In this
Article, Mike Pappas evaluates the use of a buyback program as a possible solution. After examining the problems of the Gulf fisheries both before and after
the hurricanes, he looks at other buyback programs that have been successful
elsewhere in the United States. He then analyzes the potential of a buyback program in the Gulf. He concludes that although buybacks may be a useful interim
tool for improving fisheries in the Gulf, they are just one step toward recovery.
I. Introduction

II. Problems With the Gulf Coast Fishery

The Gulf of Mexico fisheries are in poor shape. A history of
inadequate management has crippled the Gulf’s productivity and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have wrecked its fishing
industry. In an effort to save both the fish populations and
the industry in the Gulf, some have suggested fishing fleet
and permit buyback programs. The hope is that such programs will decrease harvest capacity, reduce competition,
improve fishery productivity, and offer a form of relief to a
commercial fishing industry that has suffered greatly from
the storms. In the wake of the recent disasters, some see a
buyback as the foundation upon which to rebuild a better
Gulf of Mexico Fishery.
This Article strives to evaluate the possibility of a buyback program in the Gulf and to prescribe the elements
needed for its success. In shaping a solution, we must first
understand the problem; therefore, Part II examines the
troubles, new and old, of the Gulf fishery. Part III then discusses buybacks as a possible remedy and looks to the examples of past buyback programs. Based on the successes
and failures of other buybacks, Part IV analyzes the possibility of buybacks in the Gulf and suggests strategies for
shaping an optimal program. Finally, Part V concludes that
buybacks may be a useful interim tool for improving the
Gulf of Mexico fisheries but that buybacks alone cannot
solve the problems of the Gulf.

A. Pre-Hurricane Problems

Mike Pappas is a third-year law student at Stanford Law School. He grew
up in New Orleans, Louisiana, and likes nothing better than fishing for redfish in the brackish marshes of his home state.

Even before being devastated by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita in 2005, the Gulf of Mexico fisheries suffered from numerous problems. Most of them, though, stemmed from
only two sources: overcapitalization and inadequate management. Overcapitalization simply means that the commercial fishing fleet in the Gulf contained more fishing
boats than the fish populations could support. As a result,
fishing pressure pushed fish populations beyond their sustainable limits, and increased competition transformed the
fishing business into an unprofitable race for the catch.
Coupled with, and possibly contributing to, this overcapitalization problem, the inadequacy of fishery management
in the Gulf has allowed the productive Gulf fishery to suffer a long, slow decline. Lack of attention, failure to account for scientific uncertainties, poorly designed management practices, incorrectly set limits, and most grandly
a long failure even to recognize fisheries problems are just
a few of the historic mismanagements that have plagued
the Gulf fisheries.1
1. These problems are, or course, not unique to the Gulf and have
caused crises in nearly every U.S. fishery as well as fisheries worldwide. Detailing the various forms of fisheries mismanagements and
failure, though, would be an entire paper unto itself and is beyond the
scope of this analysis. As an example of just one common fisheries
management problem, though, traditional single-species take limits
have often proven incredibly ineffective. Such single-species limits
may have failed because they were based on poor science, did not account for scientific uncertainty, were based on an incorrect calculation of maximum sustainable yield, or because the single-species
approach took no account of food web components and habitat. See
generally Ray Hilborn et al., Institutions, Incentives, and the Future
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Together these two root causes, overcapitalization and inadequate management, account for the bulk the Gulf’s prehurricane fisheries problems. These ills have plagued the
Gulf and forced the fish populations and industry to endure
overfishing, derby fishing, and bycatch.
1. Overfishing
 How Overfishing Occurs. Birth and death rates shape every population, fish and otherwise. Most basically, when the
birth rate exceeds the death rate, a population will grow, and
conversely when the death rate exceeds the birth rate, a
population will dwindle. When the birth and death rates are
roughly equal, a population will remain stable. Population
dynamics do become much more complex than these simple
relationships, but these basic concepts can demonstrate the
link between overcapitalization and overfishing.
Naturally, fishing pressure can increase the death rate
among fish populations; for each fish caught or killed another fish must be born to maintain the population. Once
the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate, a fish population
will begin to decline, and even if the birth and death rates
equalize once again, the population will not return to its
original level unless there is a period in which birth rate exceeds mortality. Since overcapitalization increases fishing
pressure, it in turn can increase the mortality rate among
fish populations. The overly high demand for fish damages
the supply.
Correct management techniques could be used to counteract the overfishing effects of overcapitalization. For example, fisheries could simply be managed so that the total
permitted fish harvest allows for maintenance of a sustainable population. In fact, such a balanced, sustainable limit
has been the goal of most fisheries’ management attempts.
Unfortunately, such a result is easier to conceptualize than to
implement. Scientifically, there are problems with calculating a sustainable limit because it is difficult to strike the perfect balance between extraction and population recharge.
There are flaws and uncertainties in population monitoring,
and the fact that fish populations naturally change over time
adds instability to these calculations.2 Also, studies of fish
populations are often too infrequent to detect overfishing
before it has already reduced the fish population.
In addition to this already difficult science, fisheries
policymakers often face political pressure to increase allowable catch. Such pressure is another result of overcapitalof Fisheries, 360 Phil. Transactions of the Royal Soc’y 47
(2005) (stating: “The majority of existing governance structures encourage fishermen to overcapitalize and overexploit and managers
to elude responsibility.”); Marc Mangel & Phillip S. Levin, Regime,
Phase, and Paradigm Shifts: Making Community Ecology the Basic
Science for Fisheries, 360 Phil. Transactions of the Royal
Soc’y 95 (2005) (noting the complexity of fisheries management
and the shortcomings of a single-species approach); Susan S. Hanna,
Institutions for Marine Ecosystems: Economic Incentives and Fishery Management, Supplement: Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine Fisheries, 8 Ecological Applications S170 (1998)
(noting fishery management’s sluggish response to signals of productivity decline and the problems of single-species management);
Tim Lauck et al., Supplement: Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine Fisheries, Implementing the Precautionary Principle in
Fisheries Management Through Marine Reserves, 8 Ecological
Applications S72 (1998) (noting the global scale of fisheries problems and the uncertainties that plague fisheries management).
2. Mangel & Levin, supra note 1.
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ization because fishermen3 want more fish to be available so
that their businesses remain profitable. Also, even if policymakers somehow designed a perfect catch limit, the limit remains only as effective as its compliance and enforcement.
Thus, even ideal fisheries management may be overmatched in trying to prevent overfishing within overcapitalized fisheries.
 Particular Instances of Overfishing in the Gulf. Of the
many commercial species in the Gulf of Mexico, few have
escaped overfishing. According to a presentation by the
Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council (GMFMC)
in November 2003, most of the commercial reef fish in the
Gulf are currently either “over fished” or “undergoing over
fishing.”4 The commercially and recreationally valuable
red snapper, red grouper, and vermilion snapper are among
these reef fish undergoing overfishing, and of these, the
red grouper is the only one not currently overfished.5
Also, the red drum, prized both as a commercial fish and a
recreational sport fish, is overfished and undergoing
overfishing.6 In fact, so many of these commercial species are overfished that it seems surprising that the
GMFMC did not list shrimp as currently overfished or experiencing overfishing.7
2. Derby Fishing
 What Is Derby Fishing? Short fishing seasons and enormous industry competition force fishermen to race to take
their share of a total allowable catch (TAC), a phenomenon
often termed “derby fishing.” Seasonal management prac3. I use the term “fishermen” throughout the Article in a gender-neutral
sense. It can be read as shorthand for “men and women in the fishing industry.”
4. Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council (GMFMC) 2003
Power Point Presentation, http://www.gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMC
Web/GMFMC-DC%20Presentation_files/frame.htm.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
According to the stock status report, brown, pink, and white
shrimp are not overfished, and overfishing is not occurring
for those species. Overfishing is also not occurring in the
royal red shrimp fishery. However, it has not been determined whether royal red, rock or seabob shrimp are overfished or if overfishing is occurring in the rock and seabob
shrimp fisheries.
J.M. Harrington et al., Wasted Resources: Bycatch and
Discards in U.S. Fisheries 127 (2005), available at http://www.
Oceana.org/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/Big_Fish_Report/PDF_
Bycatch_July28.pdf [hereinafter Wasted Resources].
Such a positive picture of the shrimp population is additionally
surprising because of reports of low profits and other hardships in the
shrimping industry. Though these reports do not state that shrimp are
actually overfished, many sources do note problems of profitability
in the U.S. shrimping industry. These sources site foreign competition and high fuel prices as detriments to the industry, but they also
often link profitability problems to a scarcity of shrimp available.
For example, an article on the Environmental Defense website states
“too many boats go after a limited number of shrimp. Competition is
fierce and many shrimpers can barely eke out a living.” Environmental Defense, Battered Gulf Fisheries Look to Future: Hurricane
Aftermath Puts Focus on Dangerous Race for Fish, http://www.
environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?contentID=4874 (last visited
July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Battered Gulf Fisheries]. Of course, this
limited number of shrimp could merely reflect overcapitalization for
the natural carrying capacity.
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tices represent the initial cause of derby fishing because they
create an inflexible time period limiting the fishing season.8
Overcapitalization then aggravates the derby fishing problem because more fishermen clambering to catch a limited
number of fish in a limited time increases the intensity of
the race.
Although derby fishing does not necessarily lead to overfishing, this system can prove both dangerous for fishermen
and unfavorable to the fish market. The present management system and state of overcapitalization “create a grueling race and spur fishermen to brave dangerous conditions.”9 Derby fishing also results in early closure of fishing
seasons because fishermen race out and fill the season’s
TAC as quickly as possible.10 When the TAC has been filled,
the season effectively ends, and often seasons close well before scheduled. Such a self-perpetuating cycle demonstrates
a literal “race” to the bottom. Because seasons are limited,
fishermen rush to catch fish and fill TACs; because the
TACs fill more quickly, seasons become even shorter. Each
season then forces fishermen to race even faster for their
catch. During this whole ordeal, there is little time to consider safety of fishermen or favorable fishing conditions.
Another problem with derby fishing causing early season
closures is its adverse economic effects on the fishing industry. “Derby fishing causes the season to close earlier than anticipated and reduces the value of the landings while the season is open due to the depressed prices.”11 So, in addition to
making commercial fishing more competitive and more
dangerous, derby fishing also makes it less profitable.
 Particular Instances of Derby Fishing in the Gulf. A 1999
report by the Socioeconomic Panel of the GMFMC succinctly describes the problems that derby fishing has caused
to the Gulf’s enormously important red snapper fishery12:
Since 1990, the principal method of managing the commercial fishery for red snapper has been with quotas set
at 51% of TAC and seasonal closures after each year’s
quota was filled. The result has been an accelerating rush
for fish in which fishermen are compelled to fish as
quickly as possible to maximize their shares of the overall quota before the season is closed. Seasons have become shorter despite implementation of trip limits in
1992 and larger minimum size limits in 1994 and 1996.
The fishing year is now characterized by short periods of
intense fishing activity and large landings rather than
lower levels of activity with landings spread more uniformly throughout the year. One consequence has been
the unusually low dockside prices necessary for the market to absorb the large volumes of fish that are landed
8. Battered Gulf Fisheries, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. GMFMC and Nat’l Oceanographic & Atmospheric Admin.
(NOAA), Final Regulatory Amendment to the Reef Fish
Fishery Management Plan to Set Commercial Management
Measures for Grouper Starting in 2006 vi (2005), available at
http://www.gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/Final
%20Grouper%20RA%20Comm%2010%2012%2005.pdf [hereinafter Final Regulatory Amendment].
11. Id. at 7.
12. According to this report, “red snapper continues to be the top revenue-generating reef fish in the northern Gulf of Mexico, despite its
overfished status.” Socioeconomic Panel, Report of the Socioeconomic Panel Meeting on Reef Fish 2 (1999), http://www.
gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/sep99rpt.pdf (last
visited Aug. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Socioeconomic Panel].
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during relatively short periods of time. Average monthly
dockside prices rose in concert with the consumer price
index prior to the first closure in 1991, but since then,
prices have declined sharply during each open season
both in nominal and real (i.e., after adjusting for inflation) terms.13

Similarly, a proposed plan published in November 2005
evaluated the status of the Gulf’s grouper fishery as follows:
Under current management the GULF OF MEXICO
grouper fishery is in a downward socioeconomic spiral.
Restrictive quotas have created a derby fishery that will
result in increasingly shorter fishing seasons and greater
inefficiencies in the fleet (e.g., increasing number of
months idle and market disruptions as imports displace
the current fresh fish market during the ever lengthening closures).14

While these sources only mention the derby fishing of red
snapper and grouper,15 shrimp16 and other commercial species throughout the Gulf appear to suffer similarly.
3. Bycatch
 What Is Bycatch? Typically commercial fishing practice
is species specific; distinct fleets of fishermen seek only one
or a few specific types of fish. Often, though, the fishing
equipment (whether it be trawling nets or long lines) is not
nearly as selective as the fishermen, and non-target species
commonly get caught. This unintended catch is called bycatch, and it can have serious detrimental effects on not only
other fisheries but also on the ecosystem as a whole.
Generally, fishermen separate intended catch from bycatch and merely discard the bycatch; even if the bycatch is
an otherwise commercially valuable species, it is of no
value if not the target fish. Thus, bycatch represents the ultimate in wasteful extraction: the indiscriminate catching,
killing, and disposing of non-target species. To make matters worse, the percentage of bycatch in certain fishing industries is alarmingly high.17
 Particular Problems of Bycatch in the Gulf. Bycatch represents a recognized international problem, and even in the
context of such a worldwide issue, the bycatch of the Gulf
shrimping industry raises particular concern. Of all commercial fishing practice, shrimping has the highest percentage of bycatch, and the Gulf of Mexico shrimping industry
numbers among the most wasteful.18 Moreover, the Gulf
13. Id.
14. The Gulf of Mexico Commercial Grouper Industry Limited
Entry and Voluntary Buyback Management Plan 2 (2005),
available at http://monroe.ifas.ufl.edu/marine/GOMEXGrouper
ManagementPlan_9%2013%202005_.pdf [hereinafter The Gulf
of Mexico Commercial Grouper Industry Limited Entry
and Voluntary Buyback Management Plan].
15. For more documentation of the problems of derby fishing in the
grouper fishery, see Final Regulatory Amendment, supra note
10, at vi.
16. Battered Gulf Fisheries, supra note 7.
17. According to a recent study, the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery has
a discard to landing ratio of 0.41 and the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery has an astounding discard to landings ratio of 4.56. Wasted Resources, supra note 7, at 13.
18.
Each year, U.S. commercial fishing operations throw away
more than one million metric tons of fish, an amount equivalent to 28 percent of all commercial landings and more than
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shrimpers’ wastefulness causes even more concern within
the fishing industry because the Gulf shrimping bycatch affects red snapper populations. Thus, the shrimping bycatch
takes its toll on a highly valuable commercial and recreational fishery.19 According to the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA), “every year more than 80 percent of juvenile red snapper are caught and killed in shrimp trawls at an
average size of 4 inches.”20 As a result, “shrimp trawl
bycatch is the largest source of red snapper mortality in
the Gulf.”21
Acknowledging that this mass extermination of juvenile
snapper has handicapped attempts at snapper population recovery, the GMFMC has required bycatch reduction devices (BRDs) for shrimp trawls in federal waters.22 Unfortunately, BRDs have reduced red snapper bycatch by only
12%, largely due to noncompliance with the BRD requirements.23 The U.S. Department of Commerce has even conceded, “current efforts to reduce bycatch have fallen well
short of targeted goals.”24 The CCA reports that this bycatch
problem is so great that “it is generally acknowledged that
even if the entire directed red snapper fishery was eliminated, red snapper would never recover with current shrimp
trawl bycatch reduction rates.”25
Blaming poor management practices for both the persistently high shrimping bycatch and the failure of the red
snapper recovery efforts, the CCAhas publicly criticized the
GMFMC’s lack of action to remedy this bycatch problem.26
The CCA has supported “bycatch quotas, area closures,
BRDs, seasonal closures and effort reduction measures” and
requests “that the Council set a firm target for bycatch reduction on the order of 60% to 80% from historic levels and
achieve that target in the shortest time possible.”27 To date,
though, nothing has been done to address these concerns.28
all of the fish landed on the East and West coasts combined.
The Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery ranked worst of all, discarding more than 472,000 metric tons, or one billion pounds
of fish, nearly half of the total waste in U.S. fisheries.

19.

20.

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Aquatic Network, Discarded Bycatch Wastes Fishery Resources,
http://www.aquanet.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=580&Itemid=42 (relying on Wasted Resources, supra
note 7) (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
As stated above, “red snapper continues to be the top revenuegenerating reef fish in the northern Gulf of Mexico, despite its overfished status.” Report of the Socioeconomic Panel, supra
note 12. Additionally, red snapper attracts many recreational fishermen. Id.
Press Release, Coastal Conservation Ass’n (CCA), CCA Legal Action Demands Emergency Measures for Red Snapper (Mar. 29,
2005), available at http://www.joincca.org/Positions/2005/Snapper
%20briefing%20document.pdf (last visited July 13, 2006).
News Release, CCA, Department of Commerce Concedes Failure
on Red Snapper Rebuilding Plan (June 29, 2005), available at http://
www.ccamaine.org/snapper%20release.htm (last visited May
2006).
CCA Legal Action Demands Emergency Measures for Red Snapper, supra note 20, at 4.
Id.
Department of Commerce Concedes Failure on Red Snapper Rebuilding Plan, supra note 21.
CCA Legal Action Demands Emergency Measures for Red Snapper, supra note 20, at 5.
Id.
Id.
According to its most recent press release, the CCA reports no action
regarding bycatch reduction, though the CCA continues to urge the
GMFMC to address shrimp bycatch and continues with its lawsuit.
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B. Post-Hurricane Problems
In August and September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
ravaged the Gulf Coast. These two hurricanes visited unspeakable destruction on the region, and the coastal fishing
industry felt the full brunt of this force. The two hurricanes
caused massive damage to fishing fleets and infrastructure.
Additionally, the hurricanes crippled certain fisheries and
left huge economic losses in the fishing industry.
1. Fleet and Infrastructure Destruction
Hurricane Katrina “struck a center of commercial and recreational fishing along the Gulf of Mexico coast.”29 The affected region contained “15 major fishing ports, 177 seafood processing facilities, 1,816 federally permitted fishing vessels, and an unknown number of state permitted
fishing vessels.”30 These areas suffered “widespread
flooding and significant property and infrastructure damage,” and at the time of writing the number of fishing vessels “beached, sunk, damaged, or otherwise lost” had still
yet to be determined.31
2. Effects on Fisheries
Katrina struck the area where “10% of the shrimp and 40%
of the oysters consumed in the United States are produced.”32 According to a GMFMC briefing report from October 2005, “initial losses of seafood production are estimated at $1.1 billion for Louisiana and could exceed $200
million for Alabama, exclusive of infrastructure.”33 Most
fish and crustacean populations did survive the hurricanes
with little detrimental effect, but the oyster populations
“likely suffered significant mortality.”34 Even though the
hurricanes did not deplete most commercial species, by demolishing fishing fleets they did destroy the methods of extracting these species. In addition to the fleet destruction,
“damage to processing facilities and disruption of former
market dealer relationships will add to recovery time and alter broader seafood markets and product availability.”35
Among all this destruction, the plights of the shrimp and
oyster fisheries remain particularly notable.
 Shrimp. In addition to the costs of property and infrastructure damage, the hurricanes could not have struck at a
worse time for the shrimp industry. The damage to boats and
processing facilities in this fleet occurred during the “peak
harvesting season”36 and caused a major disruption in the in-

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Press Release, CCA, CCA Insists Council Take on Gulf Shrimp
Trawl Bycatch (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.joincca.
org/press%20releases/2006/Bycatch%20first.html.
Eugene H. Buck, CRS Report for Congress, Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita: Fishing and Aquaculture Industries—Damage and Recovery 1 (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/57873.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter CRS Report for Congress].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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dustry. Falling during the autumn white shrimp harvest, the
hurricanes prevented shrimpers from “earning much of their
annual income.”37
From an industrywide perspective, the economic losses
for shrimpers are incredible. “For shrimp, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries estimates the 12-month
potential loss at dockside at more than $81 million, with 12month potential production losses at the retail level at almost $540 million.”38 Even those shrimpers who survived
the hurricanes with little property loss may suffer as well because the high fuel costs of shrimping may make it difficult
or uneconomical to resume.39
 Oysters. The hurricanes did double damage to oyster
fisheries in the Gulf; in addition to infrastructure and fleet
destruction, some oyster populations were severely damaged “if not totally destroyed by siltation and contamination
related to Katrina.”40 In terms of economic loss for oysters,
“the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries estimates the direct loss of available resources at more than
$205 million and the 24-month potential loss at dockside at
almost $45 million, with 24-month potential production
losses at the retail level at almost $300 million.”41
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ment to fish commercially could provide interim financial
relief for those who no longer have a means of income. If
coupled with alternative job training, such a buyback program could provide the additional benefit of reducing overcapitalization in the Gulf fisheries fleets. If lost boats are not
replaced, then the fleets can be reduced to a size more suited
to fish populations.
This idea of a post-hurricane buyback program does have
some support, and general buyback solutions have been proposed. These calls for buybacks have contained little detail,
though, and have not gone far beyond expressing the basic
concept. While buybacks may be helpful in theory, the specifics of any buyback program will have the biggest impact
on its success. To accomplish the hoped-for goals, a buyback program for the Gulf must be tailored to meet the specific needs and challenges of the hurricane-torn Gulf fisheries. In order to analyze and shape a proper buyback program, then, we must consider the examples of other successful buybacks. Also, to evaluate the feasibility of such a buyback in the Gulf, it will be helpful to look at the history of
Gulf buyback proposals. With these past successes and experiences as guides, we may then offer a more informed
consideration and critique of the buyback alternatives for
the Gulf Coast.

III. Buybacks as a Possible Solution for the Gulf
A. Successful Buyback Programs
Though Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have heaped problems
upon problems, the concerns with the Gulf fisheries are
hardly new. While there have been efforts to improve the
Gulf fisheries for years, reliance interests within the fishing
industry have prevented the GMFMC from truly addressing
fisheries problems. Because many had invested in and relied
on the past fisheries management structure, changes to the
system, in the rare event that they occurred, were slow and
controversial. The hurricanes have tragically destroyed
much property in the commercial fishing industry, but they
may have also created an opportunity for fisheries reform by
reducing the reliance interests. The hurricanes have forced
the industry to start over, and hopefully future management
can learn from the problems of the past. Buybacks, programs to purchase and retire fishing boats, could take advantage of the post-hurricane rebuilding opportunity by improving fishery management and reducing overcapitalization while at the same time helping the commercial fishing industry to recover.
Certainly it would be far fetched to believe that a single
program could cure the ailing Gulf fishery of its many preand post-hurricane problems. Still, while a buyback program may not be a complete panacea, it does represent a
practical, workable step toward improving Gulf fishery
populations, profitability, and management. A buyback of
commercial fishing licenses and boats could improve a
number of troubled areas. First, such a program could provide immediate aid and income to those in the fishing industry who lost their livelihoods to the storms. Purchasing and
retiring licenses of those who now lack the capital equip37. National Geographic, Fishing “Shut Down,” Oyster Beds Destroyed
by Katrina, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/
0912_050912_katrina_fish_2.html (last visited July 13, 2006).
38. CRS Report for Congress, supra note 29, at 2.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2-3.

The most recent and successful buyback programs relevant
to the Gulf effort have taken place in the Pacific and North
Pacific; two have been in California and one in Alaska.42
Specifically, a general capacity reduction buyback throughout the Pacific and a specialized trawler buyback program in
Moro Bay, California, have demonstrated initial success and
support. Also, the buyback of Alaskan crab fleets appears to
be progressing well. Though the circumstances surrounding
these programs are dissimilar to the disastrous events in the
Gulf, the successful elements of the Alaska and California
buybacks may serve as examples for shaping a buyback design for the Gulf.
1. Federal Buyback for Pacific Groundfish Capacity
Reduction
In 2003 the federal government approved a capacity reduction buyback program to reduce the number of vessels in the
Pacific groundfish fleet.43 This program allotted $46 million
for the buyback, and $36 million of that figure represented a
30-year loan “to be repaid to the federal government by
those remaining in the affected fisheries.”44 The individual
fisheries, e.g., the groundfish, pink shrimp, and Dungeness
crab fisheries, were to share the cost of loan repayment ac42. NOAA fisheries website contains information on only two buybacks, implying that these are the only two federal programs that
have taken place. NOAA Fisheries Office of Management & Budget, Fishing Capacity Reduction Programs, http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/mb/financial_services/buyback.htm (last visited July 13, 2006).
The third buyback in Moro Bay was a privately financed effort. The
Nature Conservancy, Partners Bring Together Disparate Interests
to Protect Underwater Habitat, http://www.nature.org/success/
art15728.html (last visited July 13, 2006).
43. Trawl Fleet Harvest Capacity Reduction Process Begins, Sea
Grant Fisheries, Summer 2003, at 2, available at http://wwwcsgc.ucsd.edu/PUBLICATIONS/PDF_pubs/SGFSummer03.pdf.
44. Id.
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cording to the proportion of capacity reduced in their individual sectors.45
This voluntary program invited fishermen to submit irrevocable bids to sell their fishing businesses.46 In order to
maximize harvest capacity reduced per loan dollar spent, the
bids were divided and ranked based on the fishermen’s average total revenues, which reflected their individual percentage of extraction from the local fish populations.47 Fishermen whose bids were selected committed to surrender all
permits issued to their vessels, and their vessels were registered with the U.S. Coast Guard as ineligible for commercial fishing.48
This whole program, though, was subject to approval or
rejection through an industry referendum.49 The referendum
took place after the bids were received but before participants were informed of the outcomes.50 While approval required a simple majority, votes were weighted based on the
“debt obligation calculated for each fishery sector” according to the bid results.51 In late 2003, this referendum process
approved the buyback plan, and when the buyback was
complete, the vessels removed accounted for at least 36.5%
of all groundfish caught in the fishery.52 As a result of this
buyback program, certain trip limits for vessels remaining in
the fishery were expected to increase 50% over the limits approved prior to the buyback.53
This trawl buyback program did succeed in decreasing
the capacity of the Pacific groundfish fleet, but problems of
bycatch and economic instability persisted, so in July 2005
the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) considered further action to reform and improve these fisheries.54
At this time, the PFMC began investigating the feasibility
and possible impacts of individual fishing quotas (IFQs) for
the Pacific groundfish fishery.55 The PFMC “indicated its
support for future use of IFQ programs . . . so that individual
fishery participants have both more flexibility in how they
choose to participate in the fishery and more accountability
for how their individual actions affect the bycatch of
overfished species in the groundfish fishery.”56 At the time
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The 36.5% represents the low range estimate of reduction, which
could go as high as 46% when another vessel classification is taken
into account. Buy-Back a Success, Fishermen’s Marketing Ass’n
Newsletter, Dec. 15, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.trawl.
org/news.pdf.
Id.
Groundfish Trawl Individual Quotas for the Pacific
Coast July 2005 Informational Report 1-2 (2005), available at
http://www.pcouncil.org/groundfish/gfifq/info_sheet.pdf.
The management technique of IFQs, or individual fish quotas, assigns to each fisherman a total amount of catch that can be harvested
in a given time period, e.g., per year, per month. The total amount of
fish to be harvested is divided between all of those in the industry.
The fisherman may fill this quota on his own schedule, so thus it allows safety and flexibility to fish when conditions are good and safe.
It also prevents derby fishing because there is no need to race because in theory there are enough fish to fill everyone’s quota. Such a
system intends to share the natural resources (everyone gets some
percent of the pie) rather than cause a competition for it (everyone
races to finish the pie first). Id. at 1-3.
Id. at 2.
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of writing, the PFMC was still working on designing and
implementing an IFQ program.57
2. Federal Buyback of Bering Sea/Aleutian Island Crab
Fleets
In December 2003, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) promulgated a final rule establishing a capacity reduction program to benefit the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Island (BSAI) King and Tanner Crab fishery.58
Under the program, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(also referred to as NOAA Fisheries Service, but hereinafter
the NMFS) would “pay participants for withdrawing vessels from fishing, relinquishing fishing licenses, and surrendering fishing histories.”59 The NMFS planned to finance
the voluntary program with a $100 million loan, to be paid
back over 30 years by those fishermen remaining in the fishery.60 Intended to increase crab harvests for remaining fishermen and to conserve and manage fishery resources, this
rule became effective in January 2004,61 and the program
appeared quite popular.62
Similar to the Pacific groundfish buyback, to enter into
this buyback fishermen offered bids for the value of their
businesses.63 Before fishermen were informed of whether
their bid had been accepted or rejected, though, the industry
was called to approve the buyback through a referendum.64
Ultimately the referendum approved the buyback, and repayment of the buyback loan was scheduled to begin in October 2005.65 The plan to finance this loan repayment relies
57. According to their most recent newsletter, the PFMC is still reviewing the environmental impacts of an IFQ program. Trawl Individual
Quotas Update—Public Workshop in April, Pacific Council
News, Winter 2005, at 3, available at http://www.pcouncil.org/
newsletters/2005/winter05.pdf.
58. Fishing Capacity Reduction Program for the Crab Species Covered
by the Fishery Management Plan for the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands
King and Tanner Crabs, 68 Fed. Reg. 69331, 69331 (Dec. 12, 2003)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600), available at http://www.nmfs.
Noaa.gov/mb/financial_services/buyback_docs/crab_buyback_
final_rule.pdf.
59. Id. at 69332.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 69331-32.
62. Of the 28 official comments on the plan, only Comment 20 challenged the buyback approach; the rest of the comments attempted to
modify or improve the rule but accepted the overall buyback structure. See id. at 69332-34.
63. Id. at 69335.
64. Id. This design seems to have benefited from the experience with
the last federal buyback because NMFS changed the timing of
the referendum:
The proposed rule provided for this notification occurring before the referendum about the reduction loan repayment fee.
Based on interim public comment during the Pacific Coast
groundfish fishing capacity reduction program (68 FR
42613), however, NMFS now believes that postponing this
notice until after the referendum has already occurred may
help neutralize any potential which the proposed rule aspect
might have had for biasing referendum results. If referendum
voters know before they vote whose bids NMFS accepted
and whose bid NMFS rejected, they may vote differently than
they otherwise would have if they did not know whose bids
NMFS accepted and whose bids NMFS rejected.
Id. at 69334.
65. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Fishing Capacity Reduction
Program; Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crabs; Industry Fee System for Fishing Capacity Reduction Loan, 70 Fed.
Reg. 54652, 54654 (Sept. 16, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
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on a fee, essentially a tax, on five types of fish from the
BSAI fishery; the tax is assessed on the fishermen when
they sell these types of fish to the initial buyer.66 Once the
buyback loan has been repaid, the tax will cease.67
3. Private/Public Buyback for Moro Bay Trawlers
Adopted in June 2005, the Moro Bay buyback program not
only intended capacity reduction but also ushered in a newly
adopted management scheme. This buyback program,
which purchased local bottom-trawling vessels, was designed to accompany the PFMC’s adoption of a ban on bottom-trawling in more than 3.8 million marine acres off of
central California.68 The PFMC classified this program as a
“a public-private partnership under which private funds are
used to purchase groundfish limited entry trawl licenses and
vessels in concert with the designation, through the Council
and NMFS, of no-trawl zones off the central California
coast.”69 The Nature Conservancy and Environmental Defense, the two organizations that funded the buyback, cooperated with local stakeholders to design this program and
“help alleviate any economic impacts of the new large notrawl zones.”70 Additionally, The Nature Conservancy and
Environmental Defense plan to continue working with
trawlers who remain in the fishery in order to monitor and
document the results of the program.71
Though the buyback’s practical success and impact on
fish population has yet to be determined, the program appears to be an initial victory for compromise and co-management. The bottom trawl ban and buyback resulted from a
partnership between The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense, the Monterey Bay Aquarium, local trawl
fishermen, and central coast harbormasters. In working together, these groups hoped to cooperatively construct a plan
to “[harmonize] conservation with viable commercial fishing, processing and distribution in central California
ports.”72 Since many of the 23 local permit holders have expressed interest in the program, the plan seems to have an
auspicious beginning.73
As intended by the cooperating groups, the widespread
acceptance of this trawl ban and buyback seems to be a result of the process used to develop the plan. According to
The Nature Conservancy, this possibly controversial program “didn’t set off a firestorm of opposition, as is often the
case, because trawl fishermen and environmentalists laid
the groundwork for consensus before the Council vote.”74

66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

600), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mb/financial_services/
buyback_docs/Fee%20System%20Final%20Rule.pdf.
Id.
Letter from Michael Grable, Chief, NOAA Fin. Servs. Div., to Fish
Sellers and Buyers, on Fee Payment Collection (Sept. 19, 1995),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mb/financial_services/
buyback_docs/FeePaymentCollectionGuidanceLetterGrable%209
%2019%2005.pdf.
The Nature Conservancy, supra note 42.
Groundfish Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)—Final Preferred Alternative 8-9
(2005), http://www.pcouncil.org/bb/2005/0605/ag_c3.pdf.
The Nature Conservancy, supra note 42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Nature Conservancy, Fisheries Council Adopts Ocean Conservation Plan Developed by a Trio of Unlikely Partners, http://www.
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The program reflects a concerted effort not only to improve
fish populations and habitat but also to protect the local fishing industry, which was concerned that “in the wake of recent federal buyout of trawlers and in the face of tighter fishing regulations, an additional buyout would disrupt supplies
of fish to Moro Bay and threaten the very existence of the
working waterfront.”75 Initially, it appears that the result has
satisfied the various interests involved.
B. Buyback History in the Gulf
While the GMFMC has completed no buyback programs to
date, there have been discussions on the matter, and a
grouper fleet buyback plan was being voted on just after the
hurricanes hit. So although there are not yet any Gulf buyback results to consider, these proposals and discussions
should be helpful in shaping and critiquing possible posthurricane buyback plans.
1. Early Buyback Suggestions
As early as 1999, the Socioeconomic Panel for the GMFMC
considered buybacks as a possible solution for problems
with the Gulf’s red snapper and red grouper fisheries.76
Noting that major regulatory change to the fishing industry
could lead to problems for fishermen and their families,77
the Socioeconomic Panel very briefly mentioned buybacks as a possible mitigation for the adverse effects.78 The
panel noted:
Given this range of social impacts, one solution may be
mitigation strategies which would address the possible
outcomes previously mentioned. Recent mitigation in
the New England Groundfish fishery and for Florida’s
gill net fishermen has included, vessel and gear buybacks; programs for retraining, i.e., aquaculture; special
enrollment onto welfare; special incentives for community development; and others.79

The attention paid to this suggestion seemed to match the
space devoted to it, though, and there is no evidence of any
action taken on this passing thought. Indeed, buybacks do
not even appear in the official “recommendations” portion
of this report.80
2. Gulf Grouper Buyback Program
The GMFMC, however, did take recent action toward instituting a buyback in the region. Responding to concerns
about overfishing, derby fishing, and the inability to quickly
institute IFQs,81 in early 2005, the U.S. Congress approved a
federal buyback program for voluntary capacity reduction

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/states/california/press/
pfmc.html (last visited July 14, 2006).
Id.
Report of the Socioeconomic Panel, supra note 12, at 35.
Such projected problems included stress, depression, substance
abuse, layoffs, and business closures. Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Grouper Buyout Informational Sheet 1 (2005), http://www.
gulfcouncil.org/downloads.htm (follow “November 14-17, 2005 Fort Walton Beach, FL (zip file - 32,872 kb)” hyperlink; then open
“B-10(b) Grouper Buyback” document).
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in the Gulf grouper fishery; to achieve its goals, the program
primarily targeted longline vessels.82 Though the grouper
buyback facially seemed to concern the entire Gulf fishery,
the reactions to and discussion of the plan seem to demonstrate that the buyback would really only affect Florida’s
commercial fisheries.83
While this buyback may be practically limited to Florida,
the funding and planning process seems similar to the Pacific federal buyback plans discussed above. Section 218 of
the Congressional Appropriations Act of 2005 approved the
voluntary buyback by authorizing a $35 million loan to be
repaid over 35 years by those remaining in the fishery.84
Congress’ loan authorization only laid the groundwork for
the program, though, and the appropriation called for a more
detailed business plan to be formulated within the fishing industry.85 The appropriation also designated that approval of
this plan would require a two-thirds majority vote of industry participants.86
 Proposed Business Plan for Gulf Grouper Buyback. As a
representative of the Gulf grouper fishing industry, the
Southern Offshore Fishing Association (SOFA) was largely
responsible for Congress’ approval of the buyback and appropriation of the $35 million loan.87 SOFA also appears to
have been involved with the steering committee, which designed the buyback’s business plan that the industry voted
on.88 This plan proposed a loan repayment method similar
to that used in the BSAI—the fishermen were not personally liable for the loan; rather, a loan repayment fee was assessed on all grouper commercially sold to fish dealers.89
82. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447,
§218, 118 Stat. 2809, 2886 (2004). See also Congress Creates
Longline Vessel Buyback Program for Gulf of Mexico, Gulf Fishery News, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 6, available at http://www.gulf
council.org/newslet/NEWSLTR-01-2005.pdf (summarizing approval of buyback plan).
83. Though the buyback nominally concerns the entire Gulf of Mexico
fishery, the reaction to the plan seems to indicate that Florida fisheries will be the most, if not the only, affected. See generally infra
notes 87 & 115.
84. Consolidated Appropriations Act §218.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. SOFA had actually sought a direct congressional appropriation to
fully fund the buyback program rather than a loan just of the initial
capital. Grouper Buyout Informational Sheet, supra note 81.
88. SOFA’s role in the business plan is more implied than directly
stated. According to GMFMC’s Grouper Buyback Informational Sheet:
Once the loan package was issued, a representative steering
committee was formed with regional representation of the
fishery. [Eleven] participants in the grouper fishery made up
the steering committee as well as advisory members from
[the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
(FWC)], Louisiana State University, University of Florida,
and Florida Sea Grant. Over the course of several months, the
steering committee, working with recommendations made
by Mike Grable, buyout specialist from NMFS, formulated
the current business plan for the buyout.
Grouper Buyout Informational Sheet, supra note 81, at 1. Additionally, the FWC also indicates that SOFA developed the voluntary buyback plan. Grouper Buyback Program Update 2 (2005),
http://www.myfwc.com/commission/2005/Nov/_presentations/
GROUPERBUYBACKPROGRAM.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Grouper Buyback Program Update].
89. Grouper Buyout Informational Sheet, supra note 81, at 2.
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This loan repayment fee was set at a maximum of 5% of
grouper value.90
To be approved, this plan first called for an industrywide
referendum, with a longline-only referendum to follow if
the first vote did not pass; if either of the referenda approved
the plan, federal legislation would then legally implement
it.91 Following acceptance of the plan, the bid process for
buybacks would begin, and qualified participants would be
able to bid their average catch history.92 Once bids were accepted, another referendum would be required to finally approve the loan repayment fee system.93
The plan did mention that an IFQ program might be preferable for addressing the grouper fishery’s problems but
noted that such an IFQ would take four to five years to implement.94 Thus, the plan proposed the buyback as a stabilization measure until an IFQ program could go into effect.95
According to the plan:
The purpose of this industry Plan is to reduce fishing effort and catch capacity to mitigate the derby effect so that
the domestic fresh fish fishery can operate year round.
The re-establishment of a year round fishery will be accomplished by implementing endorsement criteria to
eliminate the major portion of latent capacity in the fishery and a voluntary buyback program to further reduce
catch capacity/effort. The buyback will be funded by a
loan to the fishery that will be paid by the participants
that choose to remain in the fishery.96

An informational report on this buyback predicted that it
would cause a total increase in value of nearly $7 million annually for those remaining in the fishery.97 Additionally, the
report claimed that the buyback would reduce the seasonshortening effects of derby fishing and “hopefully achieve
. . . a grouper fishery of 11 months.”98 Finally, the report acknowledged that an IFQ program might be beneficial to the
grouper fishery, but it ultimately supported the buyback as
an immediate course because of the complexity and long
implementation period of an IFQ program.99
The Referendum Voting Process. All fishermen holding
commercial federal reef fish permits were invited to participate in the referendum to approve the plan.100 For passage
the plan required a supermajority of 60% approval, and
votes were to be weighted according to each permit’s catch
history from the 2001 to 2004 seasons.101 This weighting
system was designed to ensure that the voting influenced the
decision proportionally to each permit holder’s impact on



90. Id.
91. The Gulf of Mexico Commercial Grouper Industry Limited
Entry and Voluntary Buyback Management Plan, supra
note 14, at 1.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Grouper Buyout Informational Sheet, supra note 81.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2.
100. The Gulf of Mexico Commercial Grouper Industry Limited
Entry and Voluntary Buyback Management Plan, supra
note 14, at 3.
101. Id.
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the fishery.102 In the event that the industrywide vote failed
to achieve 60% approval, there would be another referendum among longline fishermen for approval of a longlinespecific buyback program.103
 Reaction to the Proposed Buyback. In October 2005,
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
(FWC) published a Grouper Buyback Program Update
evaluating the program.104 In the Update, the FWC asserted
that the buyback plan was industry-generated and had “minimal federal and no state involvement in the process.”105 The
Update also noted that the first buyback vote was completed
in early October and that the unweighted results showed
38% for and 62% against the buyback.106 The weighted results were unavailable at the time,107 but by December
newspapers were reporting that the plan passed after the
votes were weighted.108
As far as substantive criticisms, the FWC Update also
considered the general fairness and pros and cons of the proposed buyback plan, noting that an IFQ program might remove fairness concerns that existed with the buyback program.109 Among the fairness concerns with the buyback, the
Update asserted that the buyback plan would most affect
small commercial fishing operations, whereas an alternative
trip limit system would have a greater effect on the large harvesters. Similarly, the Update reported that as a result of the
buyback, “small scale or part-time fishers will be forced out
by the minimum landings criteria and the larger operations
will have the option of staying in or selling their fishing privileges.”110 The Update also noted that the buyback should
only represent a temporary solution because quota closures
and limited seasons—two management practices that the
buyback was proposed to help avoid—would be needed
once again as those remaining in the fishery became more
efficient.111 Finally, the Update took issue with the fact that
there was no process for comment on or reshaping of the
buyback plan.112 It also foresaw that the buyback might actually create a derby system among those remaining in the
fishery competing for IFQ shares.113 Ultimately, the FWC
staff preferred an IFQ program to the proposed buyback
program because the IFQ was fairer, more certain, and more
beneficial; however, the FWC did acknowledge that an IFQ
would take longer to set up and be harder to enforce.114
In addition to the FWC commentary, there was a large
public reaction to the proposed grouper buyback, with many
considering the plan and voting practice to be unfair. One
group in particular, the Florida-based Fishermen’s Advo102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Grouper Buyback Program Update, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra note 117. The discrepancy between the weighted and unweighted voting would later become a contentious point. See, e.g.,
infra note 115.
Grouper Buyback Program Update, supra note 88, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 11.
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cacy Organization, has taken a strong position against the
buyback and has urged its members to contact Congress in
opposition to the plan.115 The Fishermen’s Advocacy Organization website also directs visitors to a number of
newspaper articles from October 2005 to January 2006,
most of which vehemently oppose the buyback.116 Most of
the criticism centered on the weighted vote process, which
many regarded as corrupt.117 Thus, even though there has
been little action since the vote, the grouper buyback plan
remains controversial.
C. Post-Hurricane Buyback Proposals
Since the hurricanes decimated great parts of the Gulf fishing industry, there have been suggestions that buybacks
should play a large part in the rebuilding effort, despite criticisms of the grouper buyback program outlined above. Both
the GMFMC and Environmental Defense have advocated
for buyback programs, but only in very general terms.
Most of the buyback rhetoric, in fact, has gone into little
detail beyond the mere invocation of buybacks as a solution. Though there has been no formal plan proposed, it is
still worth examining these general suggestions for buyback programs because any buyback in the Gulf will likely
stem from this advocacy.
1. GMFMC Letter to Congress Requesting Buyback
Funding
Responding to a congressional request that the GMFMC
recommend projects to rebuild the hurricane-afflicted Gulf
fishing industry, in early October 2005 the GMFMC sent a
letter to Congress suggesting possible recovery methods.
This GMFMC letter espoused the joint goals of providing
“compassionate relief response” and addressing “overca115. Fishermen’s Advocacy Organization, http://www.fishermens
advocacy.org/index.shtml (scroll down to the “Buy Out Update”
heading) (last visited July 14, 2006). According to the Fishermen’s
Advocacy Organization website, the repayment plan for the buyback is unworkable, large commercial interests have used “back
door politics” to pass this buyback for private profit, and the buyback
is a result of political contributions to senators and congressmen in
Alaska. Id.
116. Id. (scroll down to “Here are links for recent articles regarding the
buyout and fisheries related topics” heading). Some of the links are
dead or no longer archived but others remain and contain strong sentiments against the buyback.
117. Terry Tomalin, Grouper Buyback Okayed in Weighted Vote, St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 14, 2005, available at http://www.sptimes.
com/2005/12/14/State/Grouper_buyback_okaye.shtml. This article
quoted local fishermen as follows:
Opponents of the plan say it will not reduce the number of
fish caught, but simply maximize profits for the small group
of boat owners who drafted the plan. “That is a scam if I ever
heard of one,” said Keith Hawkins, a commercial fisherman
from Tampa. “The big longliners raped the gulf and now they
want to put all the little guys out of business so they can catch
what is left.” And the National Marine Fisheries Service, he
said, “is helping them do it.” Ellis Dozier, a commercial fisherman from Steinhatchee, said the vote was “rigged from the
start.” “Most of the people I know didn’t even vote,” he said.
“The feeling was why bother. They knew what the results
would be right from the start.” The controversy stems partly
from the vote being “weighted.” That meant the votes of fishermen who caught the most grouper carried the most weight.
Additionally, the fact that the exact breakdown of the weighted votes
will remain secret (because commercial landings are not public record) does little to allay the suspicions. Id.
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pacity and overfishing through voluntary buyouts.”118 A
brief paragraph in this letter succinctly reviewed the preand post-hurricane problems with the Gulf fishery and suggested a voluntary buyback as one possible solution:
Shrimp and red snapper are overcapitalized. Red snapper
is also overfished. In addition the charterboat sector is
overcapitalized, targeting reef fish and mackerel. Inventories are incomplete, but many vessels in these three
fisheries have been damaged or lost in the northern Gulf.
A voluntary buyout of vessels and permits in these fisheries would help fishermen who choose to exit the fishery following the storms, and, at the same time, would
reduce overcapitalization and support recovery of
overfished reef fish.119

The letter goes on to offer a bit more detailed recommendation for the proposed buyback, asking Congress to
[f]ully fund a voluntary buy-back program for vessels
and permits in federally managed Gulf fisheries with
limited entry. Vessels bought-back would be scrapped
and permits would be permanently retired. The Council’s first priority is for shrimp vessels and permits, second priority is for red snapper vessels and permits, and
third priority is for charterboat vessels and permits.120
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mental Defense also recommended IFQs as an important
part of this relief strategy.127
IV. Analysis of Buybacks for the Gulf
The GMFMC letter to Congress raises the buyback issue,
but it provides no detailed suggestions for buyback structure or design. Likewise, while the Congressional Research Service and Environmental Defense advocated for
a buyback program, they did not offer any details for a
working plan. The following section hopes to pick up
where these suggestions left off and to consider the successes and failures of past buybacks in shaping a buyback
plan designed for the problems of the Gulf. This section
hopes to suggest ways to repeat the successes of the Pacific
buybacks as well as to avoid some of the criticisms of the
proposed grouper buyback.
A. Structure of a Buyback in the Gulf

In conjunction with these buyback efforts, the GMFMC
stressed the need for “job retraining for fishermen who want
to voluntarily leave the Gulf fishery.”121 At the time of this
writing, there was no evidence of a congressional response
to this letter.

Of most immediate concern is the actual structure of a proposed Gulf buyback. Funding for the program, the sine qua
non of a buyback, represents the first, and possibly highest,
hurdle. Assuming that funding is available, the experience
of other buyback programs shows that participation in program design may be key to the acceptance of a buyback.
Finally, a correctly crafted bid process and job retraining
program will be key to the success of a Gulf buyback.

2. Other Sources Suggesting Buybacks

1. Funding Issues128

As early as September 19, 2005, a Congressional Research
Service briefing, which reported to the GMFMC on hurricane issues, suggested a form of buyback in response to the
hurricane.122 The report noted an opportunity in the shrimp
industry for a “capacity reduction program to remove vessels and licenses permanently from the fleet.”123 The report
went on to suggest that the program could be funded as a
form of disaster relief, providing damage compensation for
those selling licenses and vessels while reducing competition for those remaining in the industry.124
Also, Environmental Defense, one of the groups instrumental in the Moro Bay trawler buyback, has advocated for
a number of congressionally funded “smart tools for recovery” in the wake of the hurricanes.125 Environmental Defense listed “voluntary vessel buyouts and job retraining for
fishermen who choose to leave” as tools of “smart disaster
relief”; in line with this sentiment, Environmental Defense
supported the GMFMC’s buyback suggestion.126 Environ118. Letter from Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council, to
Senators Thad Cochran and Trent Lott 1 (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.
Gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/Ltr%20to%20
Cochran%20and%20Lott.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Letter to Senators Thad Cochran and Trent Lott].
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
122. CRS Report for Congress, supra note 29, at 5.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Battered Gulf Fisheries, supra note 7.
126. Id.

 Federal Funding. It is obvious that for any buyback to
function, funds must be available to buy the vessels or permits in question. The GMFMC’s letter seems to wish away
this threshold funding problem by requesting that Congress fully fund the buyback initiative. While it certainly
cannot hurt to ask, it is unlikely that such generosity will
be forthcoming.
Full federal funding for the buyback appears improbable
for a number of reasons. First, such wholesale funding is un-

127. Id.
128.
Under section 312(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act),
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has the authority to conduct a fishing capacity reduction program if
funds are provided and it is determined that such a program is
necessary to prevent or end overfishing, rebuild stocks of
fish, or achieve measurable or significant improvements in
the conservation and management of the fishery. Under the
authority of this section, the Secretary may buy back vessels
and/or fishing permits in order to obtain the maximum sustained reduction in fishing capacity at the least cost and in a
minimum period of time. Declaration of a fishery resource disaster is not required to authorize such a program.
The capacity reduction program must be consistent with
any State and Federal fishery management plans in place
for that fishery. Funding for such programs is authorized
under Section 312(c) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and allows NMFS to obtain funding under authorization of the
Saltonstall-Kennedy Act, through specific appropriations,
from industry fee systems, and from public, private, or nonprofit sources.
NOAA Fisheries Office of Management & Budget, Fishing Capacity Reduction Programs, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mb/financial_
services/buyback.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
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precedented. In every example of a federally funded buyback, from the Pacific groundfish fleet to the BSAI crab
fleet to the Gulf grouper fleet, Congress has demonstrated a
preference for a loan system rather than a full buyback subsidy. While the overwhelming tragedy of the present situation definitely differentiates the Gulf from those past examples, it is not clear that the widespread destruction actually
helps the buyback’s funding chances. There is an argument
that Congress should be more willing to fully fund a posthurricane buyback because it combines emergency relief
with correction of fisheries problems, and in the wake of
such a disaster, some might expect Congress to act more
generously. Conversely, the extent of the hurricanes’ destruction will likely spread federal aid money thin, and rebuilding fisheries might not be the first priority for many
congressmen. In fact, as early as November 2005, Congress
demonstrated signs of “Katrina fatigue” and appeared to
scale back relief money for the hurricane afflicted areas.129
Fisheries may simply lack the glamour or power as an industry to compete with other requests for federal money. Even
though this buyback may be more urgent than those of the
past, Congress may actually be less likely to approve full
funding for this project.
For any post-hurricane buyback plan to be successful,
then, its viability must not rely on complete federal funding.
Realistically, any federally sponsored post-hurricane buyback would more likely resemble the buybacks of the past
and involve a federal loan to be repaid by those remaining in
the industry. Yet the extent of the hurricanes’ damage casts
doubts even on this time-proven funding formula. A loan to
fund this buyback would require significant federal capital
upfront, and the federal government, having already spent
so much on post-hurricane efforts, may simply be unable or
unwilling to loan that quantity of money for a buyback.
A buyback program relying on a loan might create other
administrative problems as well, because any repayment
scheme that would burden those remaining in the industry
would likely require industrywide approval. Using the
grouper buyback as an example, any federal buyback loan
would ultimately have to be repaid by those remaining in the
industry, so there would have to be industrywide consent for
such a program. Gaining such consent would require a voting process similar to that in the grouper buyback, and the
results could cause similar controversy. Additionally, since
the hurricanes displaced so many residents, voting and even
basic information gathering have proven difficult,130 so by
the time an effective vote could be taken a buyback program
may be too late to provide hurricane relief.131
 Private Funding. As an alternative to federal funding,
the GMFMC might court private organizations to fund the
buyback, similar to the Moro Bay trawler buyback program.
Environmental Defense, one of the Moro Bay buyback
funders, has publicized ideological support for buybacks as
129. See, e.g., Donna Brazile, Don’t Give In to Katrina Fatigue, There
Are Still Millions of Gulf Coast Americans Who Need Our Help,
Time, Nov. 28, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/time/
archive/preview/0,10987,1132809,00.html.
130. Even civic elections have been postponed and absentee ballots have
created a problem. See, e.g., People for the American Way, The
Obstacles Voters Face, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.
aspx?oid=20879 (last visited July 14, 2006).
131. Such a program would still decrease the overcapitalization in the
fishery, but would likely lose the added benefit of providing relief.
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a tactic for post-hurricane fisheries rebuilding,132 so the
GMFMC might seek their financial support as well. Additionally, the GMFMC could approach other organizations
to help fund at least a portion of the capital needed for a
Gulf buyback.
Such private funding may be as hard to come by as its federal counterpart, though. First, because of the size of the affected fleets, the Gulf buyback would likely be a much
larger project than the Moro Bay program was, and private
funding may not be sufficient to get this buyback off the
ground. Also, similar to the federal government, private organizations might not prioritize fisheries issues in the face
of so much post-hurricane need. For example, while Environmental Defense did publish support for a buyback, The
Nature Conservancy, another key player in funding the
Moro Bay buybacks, has not mentioned the possibility of
such a fishery buyback.133 In a plan proposing recovery efforts after the hurricanes, The Nature Conservancy recommended a buyback of land and habitat to restore the natural
resources,134 but never mentioned a similar fleet buybacks
for the fishing industry. While fisheries concerns may have
been beyond the scope of The Nature Conservancy’s proposal, it is telling that an organization that sponsored such a
recent and successful fisheries buyback did not even mention the option in the Gulf. So private funding, like federal
funding, may be unavailable because it is already committed to other hurricane relief causes or because it does not recognize fisheries as a priority.
 Funding From Recreational Fishermen. Recreational
fishermen could represent one additional source of possible
buyback funding. For example, if recreational fishermen
were required to purchase a stamp along with their fishing
licenses, the proceeds from the stamp could fund commercial buybacks. In fact, the FWC discussed such a plan but acknowledged that the program could result in conflicts between federal and state law.135 Relying on recreational fishing interests to fund a hurricane-relief buyback may suffer
from a number of other problems as well. Whether such a
stamp program could generate sufficient funds for a largescale buyback is doubtful, and recreational fishing interests,
which also suffered damage from the hurricanes, might not
be enthusiastic about any added burden. Also, if at all feasible, the proposed stamp program would likely only work for
species like grouper that support both a recreational and
commercial fishery; the already slim possibility for success
almost disappears for fisheries like shrimping, which have
few recreational components.136 Still, a Gulf buyback may
require creative funding sources like recreational fishermen, and even if a stamp program could not fund the whole
132. Battered Gulf Fisheries, supra note 7.
133. See The Nature Conservancy, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Recovery (2005), http://www.clear.lsu.edu/clear/web-content/
Testimonies/TNC.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006).
134. Id. at 3.
135. The funds from stamp sales would go into the state treasury, but the
permits to be bought back were federally issued. Grouper Buyback Program Update, supra note 88, at 12.
136. On the other hand, recreational fishermen, like those represented in
the CCA, may support a shrimp industry buyback because the
bycatch of the shrimping industry has had severe effects on the snapper fisheries, so a reduction in shrimping pressure could improve the
recreational snapper fishery. See CCA Legal Action Demands
Emergency Measures for Red Snapper, supra note 20.
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buyback, it could represent just one of many funding
sources needed to raise the necessary capital.
2. Cooperative Participation in Design
The experiences of other buybacks, particularly the Moro
Bay and grouper buybacks, demonstrate that cooperative involvement in program design and consensus building can
greatly affect the success of a buyback program. For example, the Moro Bay buyback was greeted with wide support
because various interests, both commercial and environmental, all participated in shaping the program. The opposite is true of the grouper buyback, which was plagued with
distrust, suspicion, and allegation, even between and among
members of the commercial fishing industry. Bearing in
mind the very different experiences of these two buyback
programs, naturally a Gulf buyback should try to mimic
those aspects of the Moro Bay program that led to its success
and avoid the failings of the grouper project. The most obvious way to do this is to consciously attempt, as the Moro Bay
project did, to involve various stakeholders and interests in
as much of the planning as possible. While attempting to
reach an agreement between groups might make the planning aspects of the program more difficult, a cooperative design should make implementation much easier and pave the
way for success.
Recommending that a program be based on a consensus
agreement is easy; actually building the consensus is the
challenge. Nonetheless, hopefully the GMFMC can repeat
the success of the Moro Bay buyback by involving both
large- and small-scale members of the industry in the design
process. Additionally, the GMFMC should consciously
manage any post-hurricane buyback program to avoid the
criticisms that plagued the grouper buyback. Unfortunately,
the need to act relatively quickly in administering hurricane
aid might not allow time to build an ideal consensus arrangement. In that case, the next best technique seems to be involving stakeholders when possible and otherwise conducting the process in a highly transparent manner. By keeping
the public informed, a Gulf buyback program may be able to
avoid some of the pitfalls of the grouper program and instead foster trust, cooperation, and acceptance.
3. Bid Process
Though the bidding process may not be the biggest of the
buyback challenges, it does raise important issues because it
can work both to assure that fishermen are not bought out
unfairly and to guarantee the maximum fishery impact per
buyback dollar spent. Presumably, the basic bid system
would resemble those in the buybacks discussed above, and
each fisherman would propose the value of his business
based on past landing records. Assuming this information is
still available, such bidding could be simple, but the hurricanes may have destroyed landing records and otherwise
created valuation problems. Thus, the GMFMC will have to
decide what documents, if any, a fisherman will need to
prove the value of his business.
Additionally, for a buyback program designed as a relief
measure, it might not make sense to focus solely upon catch
history or extraction levels to decide which bids are accepted. From a relief point of view, it may actually be most
productive to buy back permits only from those who lost
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their equipment. Such an approach would focus more on
aiding those who lost their livelihoods. Conversely, if one
really wanted to remove maximum harvesting capacity,
only the largest extractors with the lowest bids should be
bought out; this approach more closely resembles the model
of other buybacks, which sought to maximize harvest capacity removed per dollar spent. So, the GMFMC must decide what balance of relief and capacity reduction the buyback wishes to strike. These concerns amount to policy
choices that the GMFMC is fully competent to make. It is
important, though, that such choices be considered before
implementing a post-hurricane buyback.
4. Job Training
For many along the Gulf Coast, fishing is not only a livelihood but also a part of their culture and heritage.137 For some
fishing is all they know, for others fishing is all they want to
know.138 The fact that the proposed buyback is voluntary
will, of course, allow those who wish to remain in the fishing industry to do so, but that does not solve the problem of
those who leave the industry but know no other trade. Additionally, fishermen that are bought-out but not retrained are
likely to merely relocate on the Gulf and return to the fishing
industry, and such location shuffling will do little to solve
the Gulf’s fisheries problems. Thus, job training and transitional resources will be necessary for relocating former fishermen to other employment, and the success of this relocation will be a large factor in the success of any Gulf buyback.
Recognizing this challenge, the GMFMC’s buyback proposal letter acknowledged the importance of job training. In
fact, the GMFMC’s proposal specifically called for “job retraining for fishermen who want to voluntarily leave the
Gulf fishery” as well as for alternate work arrangements like
“funding to contract with fishing vessels to remove hurricane debris from state and federal waters.”139 While the proposal calls for funding, it remains vague about what exactly
these retraining programs might be. The letter suggests that
former fishermen may be trained as “shrimp fishery observers and reef fishery observers,”140 but these two options cannot represent the extent of the retraining program.
A socioeconomic report from 1999 did contemplate some
other possible jobs for former fishermen: “aquaculture; special enrollment onto welfare; special incentives for community development; and others,”141 but again this list seems
merely an afterthought. Really, it appears that the GMFMC
has not fully considered the job training or placement pro137.
Shrimping is part of southern culture, a trade that is passed on
and binds generations and families. For Nguyen and the
many other Vietnamese immigrants, many now subsisting on
donated food, shrimping was their American dream . . .
“You’ve got families displaced out of heritages and livelihoods . . . It’s the only thing they’ve known,” [said Joey Rodriguez, a shrimper from Alabama].

138.
139.
140.
141.

Associated Press, Katrina Could Be End of Line for Gulf Shrimpers,
St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.sptimes.com/
2005/09/15/Business/Katrina_could_be_end_.shtml (last visited
Aug. 31, 2006).
Id. Many retirees from the industry even find it difficult to
stop fishing.
Letter to Senators Thad Cochran and Trent Lott, supra note 118, at 3.
Id.
Report of the Socioeconomic Panel, supra note 12, at 35.
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grams that will be crucial to the success of a buyback. Again,
the experience of the PFMC might provide some examples
worth following in the Gulf.
Though not directly addressing buybacks, the PFMC has
considered programs for job training and support for fishermen transitioning out of the industry.142 For example, the
PFMC has developed “Groundfish Disaster Outreach Programs” and “Groundfish Disaster Relief Programs” in Oregon and California, respectively.143 These programs, designed to help families cope with local groundfish disasters,
include information on transitioning from the fishing industry, a six-step process to help with the transition, some financial management counseling, and references to other job opportunities.144 While the PFMC’s program may fall short of
ideal, it does provide an example from which to work. By
simply designing a resource similar to the PFMC’s programs, the GMFMC could provide a better organized and
more comprehensive job training and transition program.
More ambitiously, the GMFMC could attempt to improve
upon the PFMC’s resource and greatly increase a buyback
program’s likelihood of success.
B. Political Feasibility
Because the GMFMC proposed a buyback, one can assume
that a post-hurricane buyback is politically feasible. In fact,
a buyback program might be very popular because it would
provide both hurricane relief and improve fisheries. Still, it
is worth considering the possible political impediments to a
buyback program.
1. General Concerns
One might imagine that the controversy surrounding the
grouper buyback program would create a public relations
problem for a post-hurricane buyback, but hopefully the
situations are different enough that this is not an issue.
Also, as discussed above, conscious efforts to include interested stakeholders in designing a post-hurricane buyback should be able to avoid many of the problems the
grouper buyback encountered.
More likely, the political issues for a post-hurricane fisheries buyback will revolve around the question of what priority does commercial fishing deserve in the allocation of
limited funding. Especially with a buyback, which requires
such a heavy capital expenditure, it may be difficult to convince people that fisheries are of such immediate concern
that they should trump the many other requests for aid.
2. Concerns Among Fishermen
Again, hopefully cooperation and transparency will lead to
a buyback program that can satisfy all interested parties.
But counter arguments can be made against even the bestdesigned policy. This section attempts to anticipate some of
the criticisms against the buyback that may be made by or on
behalf of fishermen.
Some might argue that even though the buyback would be
voluntary, reduction of Gulf fishing fleets amounts to de142. PFMC, Disaster Relief and Assistance for Families and Businesses,
http://www.pcouncil.org/communities/families.html (last visited
July 13, 2006).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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struction of cultural heritage. Such a point of view might
equate supporting a buyback to underwriting cultural destruction. This viewpoint, if widespread, could lead fishing
communities to resist the buyback. Given the circumstances, though, major resistance on these grounds seems
unlikely. After all, it is not the buyback that will destroy
livelihoods; it was the hurricanes that did. Hopefully, the
buyback will be seen as assistance and improvement rather
than a blow to the fishing community.
Another possible objection to the buyback is that it will
create fishing cartels, leaving the fishing industry in the
hands of a few major players rather than allowing it to be
shared among small family operations.145 Similar worries of
creating fishing trusts arose in the criticism of the grouper
buyback.146 If the voluntary nature of the buyback does not
alleviate these concerns (which it did not in the grouper buyback), then any hurricane relief buyback must take steps to
avoid them. Of course, the first way to avoid these suspicions would be to have a transparent, participatory design
process for the buyback. If criticisms persist, though, an
industrywide referendum may ultimately be necessary to
justify the program, and, as the grouper buyback demonstrated, such a vote would likely require an unweighted majority to pass. Such measures might add to the implementation time and complexity of the buyback plan, but would
hopefully prove worthwhile by building support.
Finally, fishermen might hesitate to sell to a buyback program if they believe an IFQ program will soon follow and
guarantee a profitable industry. People may make the economic decision to remain in the fishery in order to receive
their allocated IFQ share. Because of the massive destruction to fisheries fleets, though, most fishermen may not be in
a position to hold out for this economic speculation.
V. Considerations to Ensure Effectiveness
If designed and implemented correctly, a post-hurricane
buyback should help alleviate some of the pre- and posthurricane fisheries problems. Most urgently, a buyback
could provide relief to those whose livelihoods have been
destroyed. Additionally, a buyback should reduce derby
fishing by reducing the number of vessels in the fleets; this
solution may only be temporary, though, and an IFQ will
probably be necessary to eliminate derby fishing.147 A buyback of shrimp vessels in the Gulf would also likely decrease bycatch, improving both the red snapper fishery148
and the ecosystem in general.149
145. Similar criticisms have been made against IFQs. See, e.g., Pietro
Parravano et al., Can’t We Just Get Along, It’s Time for Fishing
Groups to Find an Accord on IFQs, Fishermen’s News, Nov.
2002, available at http://www.pcffa.org/fn-nov02.htm.
146. See Tomalin, Grouper Buyback Okayed in Weighted Vote, supra
note 117.
147. Actually, and IFQ will probably make derby fishing worse before it
makes it better, but the long-term reduction should be beneficial.
There are reports that implementation of an IFQ will actually increase derby fishing just before the IFQ is put in place because fishermen will want to maximize their allotted quotas. Grouper Buyback Program Update, supra note 88, at 8.
148. See CCA Legal Action Demands Emergency Measures for Red
Snapper, supra note 20.
149. For example, a reduction of the shrimp fleet might benefit the population of the endangered Kemp’s Ridley Sea Turtles in the Gulf,
which are often caught in shrimp nets that lack turtle exclusion devices. Carole H. Allen, An Ill Wind Might Help the Shrimp Industry!,
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Yet all of these benefits rely on a properly designed and
implemented buyback program. Of course, no system will
be perfect, but by relying on the lessons learned from other
buyback programs and keeping the following points in
mind, the GMFMC should be able to design a workable
Gulf buyback.
A. Cooperation Can Make or Break a Buyback
The Moro Bay buyback showed some very successful design elements that any hurricane relief buyback (or any
other buyback hoping for success) should strive to repeat.
Though an obvious tactic that has been mentioned repeatedly, cooperation and understanding between interested
parties cannot be overstressed.
B. A Buyback Is Not the Complete Solution
A post-hurricane buyback may be a popular solution for the
Gulf fisheries and may be more easily accepted than the
grouper buyback in the Gulf was. Managers of the Gulf fishery should not allow the popularity of a buyback plan to
overshadow the limitations of the buyback, though. A buyback may represent an immediate form of aid to the Gulf, but
it will not be the complete solution. Thus, any buyback plan
should be designed with other management reforms in
mind. A Gulf buyback program should follow the example
of the Moro Bay success and should complement buybacks
with new management techniques such as heightened gear
requirements for bycatch reduction, lower TACs, improved
scientific techniques for limit calculation, or even fishing
closures or limitations in some critical habitat areas. Since a
buyback would benefit those remaining in the industry by
reducing competition, the GMFMC should tie this boon to
the burden of stricter management.
Finally, the GMFMC should bear in mind that a buyback
program should not end when the vessels are bought back.
For example, the Moro Bay buyback program contained
plans to continue monitoring and working with those fishermen who remained in the industry. Such continued monitoring also benefited the Pacific groundfish buyback program,
which began considering IFQ programs after it determined
that the buyback alone would not be sufficient. The
GMFMC should embrace a similar plan of follow-up work
and monitoring within the fisheries to assess the successes
and remedy the failures of the buyback.
C. IFQ Programs
A variety of groups, from the PFMC to FWC to Environmental Defense150 and even to the GMFMC,151 have sugHelp Endangered Animals Ridley Turtles, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://www.ridleyturtles.org/ (last visited July 14, 2006).
150. Individual Fishing Quotas, An Important Management Tool to Promote Sustainable Fisheries, http://www.environmentaldefense.org/
documents/1969_IFQbrief4.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006).
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gested or employed IFQs in some capacity. From all these
organizations, there appears to be a general agreement that
IFQs are needed; unfortunately, there also seems to be
agreement that IFQ programs will take time and study before being implemented. Since buybacks can be instituted
more quickly, they make sense as an interim measure, but
the GMFMC should maintain a commitment to working toward IFQs as soon as possible. Thus, the GMFMC should
plan on a buyback that allows and prepares for an IFQ program to follow.
D. Address Neighboring States
The hurricanes destroyed many of the Gulf’s commercial
fishing fleets, but not all of them, and the GMFMC should
keep this consideration in mind when designing and presenting a buyback plan. For example, some accounts state
that “Texas shrimpers escaped unscathed,” while the hurricanes destroyed fleets in Louisiana.152 Also, even though
the hurricanes reduced the size of the shrimp fleet, shrimp
harvests have not decreased because enterprising fishermen
from neighboring states have taken advantage of the reduced competition.153 For purposes of equity and popularity, then, the GMFMC must be careful not to design a buyback that essentially removes the fishing industry from one
state and hands it to another.
VI. Conclusion
Buybacks are a logical first thought for dealing with the hurricane-ravaged Gulf fishery because they can potentially
solve both pre- and post-hurricane problems. Fisheries
managers must be careful, though, not to rely solely on this
seemingly easy fix. A hurricane relief buyback does appear
to be a beneficial tactic, but it must remain an interim tactic
in order to cause any long-term benefit in the Gulf fishery.
While a buyback may appear to be a fix-all, it is really just
a band-aid. There will be much more action needed for the
Gulf fishery to recover. The road to sustainability in the Gulf
fisheries will be a long one, and it will likely require great
management and monitoring improvements over the next
decades. Though a Gulf buyback would be just the first step
of this journey, it appears to be a step in the right direction.
151. An IFQ program for the snapper fishery is already being established
and the GMFMC is looking into establishing one for Grouper. See
IFQ Referendum Overwhelmingly Approved, Gulf Fishery
News, Apr./May 2006, http://www.gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMC
Web/newslet/NEWSLTR-03-2006.pdf; Grouper Buyback Program Update, supra note 88, at 5.
152. Katrina Could Be End of Line for Gulf Shrimpers, supra note 137.
153. E-mail correspondence with Jim Cowan, Professor, Coastal Fisheries Institute and Department of Oceanography and Coastal Sciences School of the Coast and Environment at Louisiana State University (Dec. 14, 2005) (on file with author).

